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MURKY WATERS: SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA COMPELS ARBITRATION 
ALTHOUGH THERE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A CONTRACT 
By 
Michael C. Barbarula* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 The Schultzes hired the Olshan Foundation Repair Company of Mobile 
(“Olshan”) to perform foundation work on their house three different times.1 When 
the work was not performed to the Shultzes liking, they sued and Olshan sought to 
compel arbitration.2 The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the Schultzes did not 
present enough evidence to show that the 2008 work was not performed pursuant 
to the 2007 contract; it therefore granted the motion to compel arbitration.3 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
 Florence and Arnold Schultz own a home in Washington County, 
Alabama, and hired Olshan to perform work on their house.4 Olshan performed 
work on the foundation of the Schultz’s home on three separate occasions: August 
2006, March 2007, and January 2008.5 In July 2008, the Schultzes sued Olshan, 
alleging breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence and wantonness.6 The 
Schultzes alleged that Olshan performed the repair work negligently, resulting in 
damage to their house; that the value of their home decreased as a result; and that 
the Schultzes suffered emotional distress caused by the negligent home repair.7 
                                                 
* Michael C. Barbarula is a 2012 Juris Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State 
University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Olshan Found. Repair Co. of Mobile, L.P. v. Schultz, 2010 WL 4034866, *1 (Ala. 2010) 
[hereinafter Olshan]. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at *8. 
4 Id. at *1. 
5 Id. 
6 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *1. 
7 Id. 
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 Olshan responded to the complaint by filing a motion to compel 
arbitration.8 After completing some discovery to determine whether the 
controversy should proceed through arbitration, the trial court made certain factual 
determinations that the Supreme Court of Alabama accepted.9 
 The parties agreed that the work performed in August 2006 was completed 
pursuant to a contract signed by Mr. Schultz; however, neither party was able to 
produce the contract.10 Olshan produced a contract that it claimed normally was 
used when performing residential foundation repair work, the type of work done in 
this matter.11 This document contained a clause stipulating that “any dispute, 
controversy, or lawsuit between any of the parties to this agreement about any 
matter arising out of this agreement” would be submitted to binding arbitration 
using the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”).12 The Schultzes claimed 
that the condition of their home worsened after the work performed by Olshan in 
2006.13 
 In March 2007, the Schultzes rehired Olshan to perform similar repair 
work to the foundation of their home; this time, Olshan produced a copy of the 
contract dated March 2, 2007 to install nine “CableLock Plus Pilings,” which came 
with a lifetime warranty.14 The contract provided further that “the owner may order 
extra work to be done, not contemplated by this Agreement, in which event a 
separate Agreement for such work shall be entered into between [Mr. Schultz] and 
[Olshan]. No oral representation made by anyone can change or modify this 
agreement.”15 In addition, this contract contained an arbitration submission 
provision identical to that of the first contract.16 Instead of inserting nine pilings, 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *1. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at *2. 
16 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *2. 
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however, Olshan actually installed twelve; Olshan’s general manager stated that it 
was typical for his company to agree to install a certain number of pilings, but 
install more if the job so required.17 Again, Mr. Schultz stated that the work 
performed in 2007 worsened the condition of his home; this time, he did not pay 
Olshan.18 
 In January 2008, Olshan performed more work on the foundation of the 
Schultzes’ home.19 This work was done without a contract, but Olshan produced a 
letter stating that the company’s intention in performing this work was to “satisfy 
our agreement so your warranty will be instigated and we can get paid.”20 For a 
third time, Mr. Schultz said that the condition of his home worsened after Olshan’s 
repairs.21 He sued Olshan on July 28, 2008, and after Olshan’s motion to compel 
arbitration, the Schultzes amended their complaint to add claims by Mrs. Shultz 
only for negligence and wantonness.22 The trial court rendered its opinion on 
January 22, 2010. It denied the claims of Mrs. Schultz as being without merit, 
granted the motion to compel arbitration as to the work performed pursuant to the 
March 2, 2007 contract, but denied the motion to compel arbitration as to any work 
performed in 2006 and 2008.23  
 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS24 
  
 The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the denial of the motion to 
compel arbitration de novo.25 In this case, Olshan had the burden of proving a 
contract existed that contained a reference to arbitration and that was involved in 
interstate commerce.26 If Olshan could make this showing, then the burden shifted 
to the Schultzes to prove that the arbitration agreement was either invalid or did 
not apply to the controversy.27 
Olshan argued that the district court erred in denying its motion to compel 
arbitration on the 2008 work because it was done as follow-up work to the 2007 
contract, which contained an arbitration agreement.28 Olshan cited Elizabeth 
Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato to support his argument.29 The Cato court stated that all 
doubts about the arbitration provision should be decided in favor of arbitration, 
“[when] the problem at hand is in the construction of the contract language 
itself.”30 Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration should not be denied unless 
one can positively say that the arbitration provision did not cover the particular 
dispute that spawned the litigation.31 Elizabeth Homes argued that the work 
performed in their case was done as a result of a warranty provision in the original 
                                                 
24 The Analysis section does not discuss any of the work performed in 2006 as Mr. Schultz 
admitted that the contract he signed in 2006 contained a reference to arbitration. Id. at *4. 
In addition, the Court found that Mrs. Schultz’s claims were subject to the 2006 and 2007 
contracts and were arbitrable.  Id. at *12. 
25 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see Parkway Dodge v. Yarbrough, 779 So.2d 1205 
(Ala. 2000). 
26 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So.2d 1110, 
1114 (Ala. 1999). 
27 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *3; see Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So.2d 313, 
315 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So.2d 277, 280 (Ala. 
2000)). 
28 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5. 
29 Id. at *5; see Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Cato, 968 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2007) [hereinafter 
“Cato”]. 
30 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 7 (quoting Moses H. Cone 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)) (emphasis added). 
31 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *5; see United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); and Cato, 968 So.2d at 7. 
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agreement, and as such the work was part of the original agreement.32 The 
Supreme Court of Alabama agreed with Elizabeth Homes, and held that the 
homeowners failed to meet the burden of showing the arbitration provision did not 
apply to the work performed.33 
 Analogizing the case at bar to Cato, Olshan pointed to the 2007 agreement 
that provided a lifetime warranty for Olshan’s work, and argued that the 2008 work 
was done as “follow-up.”34 The Court found that the work done was either 
performed as a warranty on the 2007 contract or to complete the 2007 contract; 
therefore, Olshan met its burden and it would be up to the Schultzes to show that 
the arbitration provision did not apply.35 
 Mr. Schultz argued that the language in the 2007 contract was not broad 
enough to encompass the work performed in 2008.36 The contract provided that if 
the owner wanted extra work to be done, the parties should enter into a separate 
agreement.37 Mr. Shultz used the reasoning in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. v. Jordan decision to support his proposition.38 In that case, the 
arbitration clause applied to “all controversies which may arise between 
us…whether entered into prior [to], on, or subsequent to the date hereof,” and the 
court found it broad enough to apply to “any and all controversies…regardless of 
the kind of controversy or the date on which the controversy occurred.”39 While 
the Court agreed that the Merrill Lynch agreement was broader than the agreement 
in this case, the Court did not believe that the 2007 agreement was too narrow as to 
not apply to the work done in 2008.40 The Court believed that Mr. Schultz did not 
                                                 
32 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 10. 
33 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6; see Cato, 968 So.2d at 10-11. 
34 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *6. 
35 Id. at *7. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.; see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jordan, 719 So.2d 201 (Ala. 
1998) [hereinafter “Merrill Lynch”]. 
39 Olshan, 2010 WL 4034866 at *7 (quoting Merrill Lynch, 719 So.2d at 202-04). 
40 Id. at *8. 
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present any evidence that the 2008 work was not done in furtherance of the 2007 
contract.41 Therefore, the Court cannot say definitely that the work done was not in 
furtherance of the 2007 contract and the lower court erred in denying the motion to 
compel arbitration.42 
 
IV. SIGNIFICANCE 
 
 This is a case that should be the poster-child for bad arbitration 
agreements. Olshan took nearly two-and-a-half years to work its way through the 
courts before being compelled to arbitration. A lot of time and money were wasted 
on determining whether there was an agreement to arbitrate over the 2008 work; 
only now can the case proceed through arbitration and a final decision can be 
rendered. One has to wonder if this was even worth it to the Schultzes. They could 
have spent more on legal fees than they could possibly recover in damages to their 
home. For Olshan and businesses that work pursuant to contracts, this case is an 
example of how not to write an arbitration agreement. The courts usually uphold 
broad arbitration agreements, yet it certainly cannot be said definitively whether 
Olshan’s contract applied to future work. Since arbitration is supposed to be a 
speedy, efficient, and cheaper route to the resolution of disputes, those who draft 
arbitration clauses should take note of the time invested in this case as a reminder 
to make the clauses as broad as possible. 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
